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ABSTRACT
Through the aegis of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), China has
embarked on an ambitious effort to regain prominence in innovation and academic
contribution to knowledge after decades of relative neglect precipitated by the “cultural
revolution.” Unfortunately, initial efforts made during the last decade of the 20th century
resulted in quick growth in knowledge quantity (e.g., publications) that failed to generate
sound growth in knowledge quality (e.g., citations). Incentives in place were not producing
desired results. An innovative collaborative Internet-based Science Information System (ISIS)
was applied nation-wide in 2003 in China’s Research Community (CRC) with a variety of
embedded incentives to rectify the situation. The system has been well received. In the year
2005 alone, ISIS helped the NSFC to process more than 53,000 on-line funding applications
and 250,000 electronic reviews from 1,400 universities and research institutes in China. This
paper is aimed at exploring Information Systems (IS) innovation impact from the perspective
of incentive alignment based on CRC empirical results. Since the nation-wide application of
ISIS in 2003, CRC outcomes have markedly improved. Discussion and directions for future
research examine generalizability in the context of information systems for innovation and
collaborative business. Conclusions are drawn.
Keywords: incentive alignment, game theory, electronic knowledge repositories, reward
system, IS design
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INTRODUCTION

Academic research and subsequent contribution to literature by Chinese scholars are only beginning to
recover after the impact of the “cultural revolution.” Unfortunately, initial efforts in inducing
contribution resulted in: perceived inequality for funding support, misconduct leading to publication
quantity without quality, and general lack of recognition by the rest of the world. Quick growth in
publication quantity saw only meagre growth in the number of citations. Simply put, incentives in
place were not producing desired results. A game theory model is used to demonstrate that incentives
to produce without appropriate inducements and attention to quality control tend to cause the situation
that occurred. Counter-productive Nash equilibriums exist that require special attention to overcome.
This burden fell upon the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) which is the largest
and most prestigious government funding agency for basic research in China.
To effectively and efficiently encourage sustained research and contribution to globally recognized
literature, NSFC has embarked on an emphasis on the Internet-based Science Information System
(ISIS, https://isis.nsfc.gov.cn). ISIS now annually manages qualified peer review, sharing of
information and openness for critique, which culminated in research funding distribution for over
60,000 grant submissions in 2006; this exemplifies an annual increase rate of over 15%. Independent,
rationally-driven, merit-based research funding separating governmental politics from academic
achievement and recognition has begun to be achieved. Empirical results to date (reported in this
paper) illustrate solid progress in attaining system goals and objectives. Academic behavioral change
has occurred and performance has improved. Information Systems (IS) supported innovation is on the
way to illustrate positive results in a real-life complex domain.
Use of ISIS for knowledge innovation leads us to several research questions: What is the innovation
that ISIS puts into practice to win the trust of scientists? What are the incentives that ISIS conveys to
support collaborative research and knowledge sharing among scientists? What are the influences of the
application of ISIS from the perspective of knowledge management? What are the implications of ISIS
for innovative and collaborative business? The first two questions are intended to explore the
characteristics of ISIS within the framework of: Technology Adoption Model (Davis 1989), Incentive
Alignment (Ba et al. 2001) and Game Theory modelling (Zhang et al. 2006). The last two questions
are open questions and we draw conclusions based on our investigations.
In this paper, we provide additional details of IS-supported innovation for China’s research
community, including game theory analysis and empirical results to date. Discussion and directions
for future research examine generalizability and comparison to other global systems in the context of
information systems for innovation and collaborative business. Conclusions are drawn.
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BACKGROUND

Within the academic community, ideas are formed (based, in part, on existing literature) that lead to
proposals which (when subsequently funded) support research contributing to knowledge that is

reported and subsequently cited in the academic literature. This tends to generate even more ideas and
the cycle continues as we build up an ever larger body of knowledge. However, a number of problems
can easily arise. For example, perceived inequalities in research funding support can be disruptive, as
can proliferation of papers of dubious quality. Within the decade, misconduct (e.g., fraud and
plagiarism) in the Chinese research community (CRC) has been frequently reported that has drawn
considerable attention, e.g., Nature (Cyranoski 2006, Wang 2006) and Science magazine (Xin 2006).
A survey (Li 2004) based on 769 scientists funded by NSFC from 1995-1999 reported that 30% of the
scientists had perceived misconducts occurring around them; 45.87% thought the problem was more
serious than other countries and 48.66% thought it was as serious as others. Another survey (Chen &
He 2006) based on 1,072 scientists within CRC showed that 32.2% had strongly perceived
misconducts occurring around them, up to 30% reported the problem to be serious or even worse.
Another phenomenon within the scope of the CRC is the significant contrast between rapid increase in
quantity versus low quality of the output. Although the rank of China in SCI counts changed from 15th
in 1991 to 6th in 2002 (Jin 2004), its rank in Essential Science Indicators is only the 14th in the world
and the 18th if SCI citation counts weighed. Since SCI was admitted as the only criteria in evaluating
research productivity, such an incentive did not seem to lead CRC to enhance Research and
Development (R&D) quality. Over 2 decades, researchers were striving to publish as many papers as
possible, at the expense of quality. They are, however, facing ever increasing demands now for better
performance coming from the government, industry and global scientific societies, accompanied by
the inducement of Chinese innovation in conjunction with the most recent 5 year plan.
Generally, quality improvement is likely to be limited without quantity but quantity is no guarantee
that quality will occur (Jin 2004). Accompanied by a lack of synthesized evaluation standards, large
percentage of scientists did not focus on contributing high-quality knowledge to the community.
Therefore, we have reason to believe that the incentives in place were not producing desired results.
Organizational
Incentive Structure
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Behavior

Organizational Objectives

Information Systems Design Objectives:
• Software engineering
• Technology acceptance
• Incentive alignment

Behavioral Theories and Paradigms:
Economics
Psychology
Sociology
Political Science
Figure 1.

Outcome

Group Support Tools:
Voting mechanisms
Market system
Others

Information Systems Design Framework for Incentive Alignment
(From Ba, Stallaert and Whinston, 2001)

In the context of incentive alignment, Ba, Stallaert and Whinston (2001, figure 1) developed a
framework that presents factors which could be influenced by IS design (square boxes) and which

theories or disciplines (rounded boxes) might be relevant to explain the relationship between user
behavior, the system’s objectives and the overall outcome. Central to the framework is the dialectical
relationship (represented by the two arrows in the opposite directions) between user behavior and the
mechanism incorporated in the information system. In the following part of our research, we are trying
to explore both the user behavior and the outcome on the road to understanding incentive consistency
and impact.
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GAME THEORY MODEL

As noted, different incentive strategies can cause knowledge users and knowledge contributors to take
different actions, moderated by exogenous variables. Then under what conditions will rewards be
misleading? How can we design mechanisms to deal with the public good problem? In Zhang et al.
(2006), we designed two game-theory models: a simple model and a complex model. The assumptions
and proofs are omitted here, that is, only the concept and result are provided.

Yes
Contribution
No

Figure 2.

IV. Non-use Problem

I. Perfect Situation

III. Dormant Situation

II. Free-riding Problem

No

Usage

Yes

Knowledge Sharing Dynamics

In public goods theory, individual rationality may lead to collective irrationality (Kollock 1999). We
designed a 2 by 2 matrix as shown in figure 2, where the two decisions are the axes (Contribute - yes
or no and Adopt - yes or no). We can also find similar problems in the context of “knowledge sharing
dilemmas” (Cabrera & Cabrera 2002). Each quadrant represents a situation. Situations II, III, IV are
considered to be troubling.
A simple model considers the “contribution or not contribution” decision. There are four possible
Nash-Equilibriums (N-Es) (four quadrants are possible). The perfect situation is the N-E attained only
when the threshold of users and contributors are all positive. Each user will contribute his/her
knowledge, and they all use others knowledge from systems. If the time cost of usage is sufficiently
low, situation I is the only N-E. If reward is sufficiently high, situations I & IV are two possible N-Es.
A complex model considers the contribution of high or low quality knowledge. There are more
possible N-Es than the simple model, which means that several situations may lead to the same
equilibriums, and that users are more sensitive to the reward. When the reward is sufficiently high, it
misleads participants to an ineffective situation, which is unique N-E, and the participants contribute a
considerable quantity of low quality knowledge but do not use knowledge. This indicates that reward
needs to be controlled at a certain level to generate an effective result. The role of incentive alignment
is indispensable.

Theoretically, we can identify the amount of reward that will lead to certain equilibriums. However,
empirically, we are not able to calculate that. Therefore, our empirical study can shed light on the
users’ behavior and the outcome of the IS application. If results show a certain situation occurring, we
can deduce the possibility of inappropriate rewards being added.
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INTERNET-BASED SCIENCE INFORMATION SYSTEM (ISIS)

The NSFC is a government organization directly affiliated to the State Council. It is the largest and
most prestigious government funding agency for basic research in China. Since 2000, ISIS has been
introduced by NSFC and generalized to nation-wide use in 2003.
ISIS is an end-to-end solution for researchers, universities/research institutes and NSFC to manage and
disseminate their research information (e.g., projects and research outputs). It has greatly simplified
the administration processes for application, evaluation and management of NSFC projects. It avoids
duplication of data entry and reduces the administrative workload and human errors. It also
standardizes the processes and technologies for R&D project administration. Its core functions are:
• Project Application: XML-based electronic document management and submission as well as
decision-making support and online review and analysis of application statistics;
• Project Management: Project risk control, analysis of project statistics and project progress and
completion reports; and
• Dissemination of Research Outputs: Submission of research results and search and publication of
research results.
Any individual researcher can obtain general information on projects approved by the NSFC through
ISIS, e.g., project history searches and duplication checks. NSFC program directors, research
administrators in universities and research institutions can use ISIS for managing and monitoring the
progress of NSFC projects. A major advantage of ISIS is that it allows non-registered users to obtain
project information for public supervision (Li 2008). ISIS also accepts data exchanges from
internet-based research information systems (IRIS) from participating universities and research
institutions, which provides opportunities for extended system application such as institutionally
developed database-access-interface to ISIS, Data-exchange Software Packages and virtual research
centres for international cooperation (Li 2008, He et al. 2007, Xie et al. 2008, Huang et al. 2003).
Good adoption comes from good IS design regarding to the TAM (Davis 1989) model, in the rest of
the research, we do not track the trivial evidences of good IS design, but rather, the mechanism behind
which brings innovation for CRC to overcome previous disadvantages.
With the application of ISIS, the R&D resource distribution process is becoming increasingly
transparent. Scientists from all over the world as well as any individuals interested in the CRC are able
to obtain information related to the grants, successful research projects and research outputs. Further,
the mechanism of resource allocation goes toward an independent, rationally-driven, merit-based
direction, while gradually separating governmental politics and academic achievement recognition.
Growing participating and exchanging behavior has emerged, making it appropriate for us to study the
problem in the context of electronic knowledge repositories.
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RESEARCH APPROACH

Based on previous theory model and the framework of “Information Systems Design Framework for
Incentive Alignment” (Ba et al. 2001), our research approach is illustrated in figure 3.
Behaviors of
all kinds of
users in ISIS
to
find
improvement
in mechanism

Organizational Incentive Structure

User
Behavior

Information System
Design:
Need Incentive
Alignment or not?

Outcome

Performance
of CRC in
recent years to
find
enhancement
of
research
quality

Mechanisms
Figure 3.

Research Approach Framework

We focused on the path of user behavior to the outcome of IS design. The dashed boxes are
measurements for each end of the path. We compared the outcomes to the objectives of IS design to
answer the questions posed in the introduction. Two exogenous factors (organizational incentive
structure and mechanisms) are discussed via empirical results (the dashed arrows shows the
explanation relationships).
5.1

Assessing mechanism improvement

In the allocation of R&D resources, a number of biases were possible, e.g. gender, topic, education,
etc. The statistical data on submissions and the decisions of NSFC funding from 2001 to 2007 are used
in this study. If incentives were not appropriate, the biases could be high from the result of funding
decisions. On the other hand, if incentives were aligned, there could be a trace left on the results of the
decisions during the years of the study. In the CRC, many scientists believe that the
“Power-Orientated” culture plays a role above mechanism suggesting that the fairness of the running
mechanism of ISIS could be questioned. Under such circumstances, we would expect that a scientist
would receive more scientific resources as his academic status rose. We collected the information of
Academicians of Chinese Academy of Sciences who represents the highest academic status in the
Science Community of China, and also measured the scientific resources by the number of research
projects they received annually from NSFC. We additionally examined information transparency and
richness as well as punishment for violations in the context of incentives. Rewards were considered to
be a positive incentive and punishments a negative incentive, which works well as alignment. We
observed the change of regulations and the report given by the Supervision Committee of NSFC.
There were few reported incidences in the Misconduct Report before 2003. After 2003, it has been
clearly published each year and provides specific project information. We also examined
organizational level incentives to find how the NSFC monitors institutional performance and how
institutions encourage their members to submit high quality proposals. More detail is available in the
results section.

5.2

Ascertaining enhancement of Research Quality

To empirically examine enhancement of research quality, three disciplines (Earth Science,
Chemistry and Management Science) were randomly chosen from the six disciplines that NSFC
supports: Physics, Chemistry, Maths, Earth Science, Biology and Management Science. Three or four
top journals were selected (also randomly) in each discipline with high Impact Factor in Journal
Citation Reports database (JCR Science Edition 2006, ISI Web of Knowledge). The Nature and
Science Magazine (from 2000-2007) was also selected to reflect the trend for all natural science
research outcomes. Papers published by Chinese scientists from 1987-2007 were counted, within
which papers sponsored by NSFC were calculated. If the percentage of the NSFC sponsored papers
increased, we felt we had reason to believe that the NSFC was doing a better job than other
foundations in China in the field of basic research funding. Since the total amount of funding did
increase, a higher percentage illustrates the enhancement which, in part, eliminates other factors
influencing paper quality. We then tracked the funding record of the authors of those sponsored
papers. First, we examined their performance among all the applicants for the fund; then, we looked
into their collaborative behavior. The joint research fund for overseas Chinese young scholars
represented the cross-district collaboration of researchers. We examined data for joint research
funding from 2001 to 2007. By analyzing the funding percentage and award per project, we could see
if NSFC rewards through the years encouraged researchers to collaborate. We also examined the
number of proposals each year to reflect the researchers’ intention to share project knowledge.
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Figure 4.

Funding for NSFC, from 2001 to 2007

Figure 4 illustrates NSFC funding from 2001-2007 with respective program proposal acceptance
submission ratios. In general, we note the relatively increased equality and balance across all of the
programs supported since the ISIS introduction in 2003 in conjunction with peer review in the
presence of ever increasing submissions and funding. Competition remains keen in that over four out
of five proposals go unfunded. Retaining motivation for contribution and sharing is a challenge.
As we mentioned previously, many Chinese scientists have believed that the “Power-Orientated”
culture plays a role above mechanism so that the fairness of the running mechanism of ISIS could be
questioned. We now examine that issue in more detail. From 2001 to 2005, the Chinese Academy of
Sciences accepted 159 new Academicians every other year. The number of newly elected
Academicians was 56 in 2001, 58 in 2003 and 45 in 2005 (http://www.cas.ac.cn). Based on the project
history search function of ISIS, we found among all the newly elected Academicians, there were
29(52%) in 2001, 15(24%) in 2003 and 18(40%) in 2005 that had been funded by NSFC. We tracked
the record of the projects and counted the number of projects that they were in charge of from 1999 to
2007, and then we ran tests for 4 groups of data through Wilcoxon Test to test if there was a
significant increase in the number of projects. The groups were:
• Group 1: 2 years’ data before and after 2001 for newly elected Academicians in 2001
• Group 2: 2 years’ data before and after 2003 for newly elected Academicians in 2003
• Group 3: 2 years’ data before and after 2005 for newly elected Academicians in 2005
• Group 4: 4 years’ data before and after 2003 for newly elected Academicians in 2003
In the results, we indicate whether the changes are significant before and after the raise in their status.

Group

Sample

1

29

2

15

3

18

4

15

Time Section

Mean

Standard deviation

[2000,2001]

0.3793

0.49380

[2002,2003]

0.8621

0.63943

[2002,2003]

0.6667

0.61721

[2004,2005]

0.6000

0.50709

[2004,2005]

0.3333

0.59409

[2006,2007]

0.4444

0.51131

[2000,2003]

1.2000

0.73679

[2004,2007]

1.2000

0.77460

Z-value

Asymp.Sig (2-tailed)

*

0.003

-0.333

0.739

-0.632

0.527

0.000

1.000

-2.977

Note: “*” represents significant under 95% confidence interval.

Table 1.

Mean Statistics and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test of Different Groups

Table 1 shows that newly elected Academicians in 2001 received 0.46 unit more projects on average
and that this change is statistically significant. Newly elected Academicians in 2003 and 2005 did not
show this trend. Before 2001, scientists would receive more scientific resources after their academic
status was raised. In 2003 and 2005, this situation no longer existed. This implies that fairness in the
process of resource allocation has been improved, especially after the application of ISIS in the year
2003. ISIS submission data from 2003 to 2006 also demonstrate that female researchers are making

more submissions annually (from 24% to 31%). A similar situation existed for Associate Professors
compared to Professors (from 13% to 16%), indicative of enhanced equality following ISIS
introduction.
From the website of NSFC and the hyperlink to the Supervision Committee, no statistics on
misconduct cases were published before 2003. Since 2004, the committee started to publish annual
reports on the details of the misconduct cases. They even put the punishment decision reports online,
providing detailed information on the misconducts. The numbers of the publicized misconduct cases
were 16, 20 and 10 in 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively. Considering that the number of submissions
and funded proposals nearly doubled during the period since the ISIS introduction in 2003, the trends
are, indeed, encouraging.
In terms of organizational level incentives, the NSFC puts emphasis on group performance. In each
year’s annual report, the top 20 universities and top 20 research institutions are listed according to
their ability to garner NSFC grants. The number of organizations competing for the grants (shown in
table 2) continues to grow. As a result, individual applicants are getting feedback and help from their
organizations’ intellectual advisors responsible for the quality of proposals before they reach ISIS. In
addition, most organizations have tied promotion and award decisions to researcher proposal success
(He et al. 2007, Su et al. 2007, Gu et al. 2008). Without organizational filters, ISIS would have to cope
with many more low quality proposals that could compromise its effectiveness.

Year
Applying for general
projects
Funding Ratios
Funding over 2 million
RMB

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

-

657/1200

672/1126

705/1319

768/1417

816/1576

857/1569

-

54.75%

59.68%

53.45%

54.20%

51.78%

54.62%

94

129

137

181

222

259

-

Note: XXX/XXX represents organizations accepted / organizations applied.

Table 2

Organizational Funding Statistics

Chinese Scientists have also started to gain global recognition by improved research quality as noted
through publications in top-tier journals. In table 3, the number of papers published by CRC in the
selected top journals in Earth Science, Chemistry and Management Science has grown in recent years.
On average, nearly half have been published with NSFC funding through the use of ISIS. Taking into
consideration that the total time span is 20 years (1987-2007), it is noteworthy that more than half of
the papers have been published in the most recent 4 years. To further understand the influence of the
fund, we checked the background of those researchers who published papers under the NSFC fund in
Earth Science and Chemistry. It turned out that 64.3% of researchers in Earth Science and 65.7%
researchers in Chemistry were funded by multiple NSFC grants. This implies that they are not only
productive researchers, but also active ISIS contributors and users.

Journal

Impact Factor

Total

NSFC

Before

After

CLIM DYNAM

3.468

27

12

4(33.33%)

8(66.67%)

ACTA ASTRONOM

3.451

1

1

0(0.00%)

1(100.00%)

B AM METEOROL SOC

3.055

16

1

0(0.00%)

1(100.00%)

CHEM REV

26.054

25

13

4(30.77%)

9(69.23%)

ACCOUNTS CHEM RES

17.113

33

21

12(57.14%)

9(42.86%)

A NNU REV PHYS CHEM

11.25

3

2

0(0.00%)

2(100.00%)

PROD OPER MANAG

2.516

12

3

1(33.33%)

2(66.67%)

J OPER MANAG

2.042

9

2

0(0.00%)

2(66.67%)

TRANSPORT RES B-METH

1.761

63

13

6(46.15%)

7(53.85%)

MANAGE SCI

1.687

31

0

0(-)

0(-)

Science 2000-2007

30.028

269

78

35(44.87%)

43(55.13%)

Nature 2000-2007

26.681

188

72

32(44.44%)

40(55.56%)

Area: Earth Science 1987-2007

Area: Chemistry 1987-2007

Area: Management Science 1987-2007

Note: Meanings of the columns are as below:
Total - total counts of papers with Chinese authors; NSFC - counts of papers sponsored by NSFC;
Before - paper was received before 2003 (Including 2003); After - paper was received after 2003.

Table 3.

NSFC Funded Papers in Top Journals

Table 4 shows the joint research fund of NSFC from 2001 to 2006. The intensity of sponsorship
decreased a little in the recent 4 years, which means that it was more difficult for researchers to be
rewarded. Also, awards per project remained stable, regardless of RMB inflation, indicating that
material incentives reduced each year. However, it is noteworthy that the number of proposals grew
each year, representing increased interest in international collaboration.
Year

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Funding (Million RMB)

24.6

31.6

31.2

31.6

32

32

32

Proposals

285

316

346

359

426

452

391

Approved Projects

61

79

78

79

80

80

80

Intensity of sponsorship

21.40%

25.00%

22.54%

22.01%

18.78%

17.70%

20.72%

Award per project (Million RMB)

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.4

Note: Information of funding, proposals and approved projects comes from annual report of NSFC.

Table 4.
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Joint research fund of NSFC

DISCUSSION

Returning to our research questions, we now place our results in the context of assertions we have
made regarding ISIS impact and implications. The innovation that ISIS puts into practice to win the
trust of scientists revolves around transparency. ISIS provides a systematic and consistent means to
gather and evaluate research proposals with a sense of fairness and openness that historically has not

been experienced. Results bear this out in the noted equality of funding (independent of professional
status) that distinguishes the years after the ISIS introduction from those prior to 2003 and increased
gender equity. Embedded incentives support collaborative research and knowledge sharing. Top
scientists are not only knowledge sharers, but also part of the mechanism. They are members of
peer-review systems, who have access to all kinds of resources. Maybe in the past, without the
supervision from the public, they could benefit themselves easily; however, things have changed with
the help of ISIS. Those who used to benefit from role-based privileges have had to contribute
high-quality proposals to preserve their reputations.
From a knowledge management perspective, ISIS has provided a platform to deal with increased
funding levels coupled with peer-review that provides easy exposure to proposal expectations (and
examples for all), generating a positive feedback loop. The slowing of misconduct coupled with
increased global recognition of Chinese contributions to knowledge is an end result, as demonstrated
through publications in top journals. ISIS has provided an aligned incentive mechanism for positive
reinforcement of goals, while providing consistent quality control as noted in the stable funding
percentage statistics across programs. The implications of ISIS for innovative and collaborative
business extend beyond application in China. The system is undergoing evaluation in other
international contexts as well.
Limitations of our research are evident in that China is only one country with a unique history. There
is no clear way to conclude that ISIS was the only contributor to the academic rise beyond helping
manage the successful increase in funding support and proposal submissions. Future research will
focus on continued tracking of Chinese academic influence, including citation analysis, always
recognizing that there is a natural bias towards increased numbers of citations for older papers.
Extensions to ISIS are also underway. Ease of use and comprehensive reports are the main current
advantages of ISIS. It gives clear guidelines at each webpage, contains a demo presenting full
processes for all kinds of users, allows seamless integration with IRIS, and provides rich sets of
reports for the management with user editable report contents. Extensions focus on using ISIS to help
identify prospective reviewers based on qualifications and better manage the review process
accordingly.
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CONCLUSION

In this paper we have sought to illustrate how an information system, ISIS, with embedded incentives
consistent with China’s goals of increased global recognition can help rectify traditional dysfunctional
activity and promote increased contribution. Aspects of transparency and demonstrated equity have
been achieved along with the sharing of knowledge that has led to an overall increase in quality
proposals resulting in increased global recognition, as witnessed in publications in top journals.
Extensive peer review has been supported and quality control has been attained. Global respect and
credibility is evident as is reduction in academic misconduct. In short, the aligned incentive
mechanisms embedded in ISIS have been successful. Extensions are envisioned to further automate
decision making and effectiveness and efficiency.
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